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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Crim. No. 5-18-cr-00040-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2020 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.  
 










* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
  In 1997, Ilma Alexandra Soriano Nunez, a native and citizen of the Dominican 
Republic, entered the United States without admission or parole to live with her aunt and 
uncle in Puerto Rico.  She later moved to New York and lived with her husband, also a 
native of the Dominican Republic.  They moved to Allentown, Pennsylvania, where they 
raised two children, who are now teenagers.   
In building that life, however, Nunez relied on fraud.  In 1997, while in Puerto 
Rico, she applied for and received a United States passport using a photograph of herself 
but another person’s name, date of birth, and social security number.  Nunez renewed that 
passport in 2007 and, with her false status as a United States citizen, sponsored her 
husband for naturalization and obtained a Pennsylvania driver’s license.  In 2016, the 
person whose personal information Nunez had misappropriated applied for a passport, 
prompting an investigation into passport fraud.  In 2017, Nunez again attempted to renew 
the passport, and in 2018, a federal grand jury indicted her on four counts.  See generally 
18 U.S.C. § 3231 (granting district courts original jurisdiction over “all offenses against 
the laws of the United States”).  Those counts were (i) passport fraud, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1542; (ii) false representation of United States citizenship, see 18 U.S.C. § 911; 
(iii) Social Security fraud, see 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); and (iv) production of false 
identifying documents, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (aiding and abetting).  The day after the indictment, which was her 
fortieth birthday, Nunez was arrested, and she attended her initial appearance.   
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A few days later, Nunez returned to court for a detention hearing.  Following that 
hearing and consistent with the Bail Reform Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d), a Magistrate 
Judge ordered Nunez temporarily detained for ten days.  That detention afforded 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement an opportunity to take Nunez into custody 
pending removal proceedings.  Within those ten days, ICE lodged an immigration 
detainer against Nunez but did not take her into custody.  After that ten-day period had 
expired, a Magistrate Judge held another hearing and ordered Nunez’s pretrial release 
subject to several conditions.  The prosecutor disputed that ruling, but a District Judge 
upheld it and ordered Nunez’s pretrial release.  The next day, ICE executed its detainer 
and took Nunez into custody pending her removal proceeding.   
 Nunez challenged the legality of her ICE detention.  According to Nunez, the Bail 
Reform Act allowed the government the duration of her temporary detention – but no 
longer – to choose to detain her pending removal proceedings.  Because ICE did not take 
her into custody during that period but did so afterwards, Nunez moved to dismiss the 
indictment and sought release from ICE custody.  The District Court denied her requests 
to dismiss and for release, and Nunez filed an immediate appeal.   
 This Court resolved Nunez’s interlocutory appeal in a precedential opinion.  See 
United States v. Nunez, 928 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2019).  As that opinion explained, the 
denial of Nunez’s motion to dismiss the indictment was not a final judgment within this 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  Id. at 243–44.  By statute, however, the District Court’s 
order denying Nunez’s request for release from detention could be immediately appealed.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); see also Nunez, 928 F.3d at 244.  In addressing that issue, this 
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Court held that ICE could execute its detainer against Nunez beyond the ten-day period 
of her temporary detention.  Nunez, 928 F.3d at 247. 
With that resolution of Nunez’s interlocutory appeal, the criminal case against her 
proceeded.  Nunez entered an open guilty plea to all four counts, and the District Court 
sentenced her to prison for a year and a day followed by a three-year term of supervised 
release.1  
In this appeal, Nunez renews her challenge to the indictment based on her 
detention by ICE, and she disputes two components of her sentence – the term of 
imprisonment and the imposition of supervised release after her sentence.  In exercising 
jurisdiction over those three challenges to a final judgment and sentence, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we will affirm for the reasons below.   
I.  
Nunez leads with the argument that her criminal indictment should be dismissed.  
As she sees it, dismissal of the indictment would remedy her detention by ICE after the 
expiration of her ten-day temporary detention.  No relevant statute or rule provides such 
relief in this circumstance, and therefore to dismiss the indictment would require resort to 
a court’s inherent powers.  See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816–17 (3d Cir. 
 
1 During the criminal case, the removal proceedings against Nunez continued as well.    
Before her guilty plea in District Court, the Immigration Court ordered Nunez’s removal 
to the Dominican Republic and denied her request for cancellation of removal.  See 
Nunez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 804 F. App’x 184, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2020) (not precedential).    
Nunez administratively appealed those rulings to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 
the Board affirmed the Immigration Court.  Id. at 187.  Nunez then sought review of the 
Board’s decision, and a panel of this Court denied her petition.  Id. at 189.  
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1979); cf. Fed. R. Crim P. 48(b) (permitting dismissal of an indictment on different 
grounds).  By precedent, a court may exercise its inherent powers to dismiss an 
indictment “only if the Government engaged in misconduct, the defendant was 
prejudiced, and no less severe remedy was available to address the prejudice.”  United 
States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); see also Chambers 
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (“Because of their very potency, inherent powers 
must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” (citation omitted)). 
 Nunez’s effort fails at the outset because the government did not engage in 
misconduct.  For perspective, Nunez makes no claim of any misconduct regarding the 
prosecution of her criminal case.  Rather, the wrongful action she alleges is ICE’s 
execution of a detainer following her release from temporary custody.  Putting aside the 
deeper question of whether a court’s inherent powers could ever permit remedying 
immigration-related misconduct through dismissal of a criminal indictment, ICE did not 
engage in wrongful conduct here.  At the time it executed its detainer, no law prohibited 
that conduct, and this Circuit subsequently held that ICE can detain a deportable alien 
after her release from temporary custody under the Bail Reform Act.  Nunez, 928 F.3d at 
247.  At the time, that holding did not apply to Nunez’s motion to dismiss the indictment 
because Nunez had prematurely appealed, leaving this Court without appellate 
jurisdiction over that issue.  But now that this appeal comes within this Court’s 
jurisdiction, Nunez cannot escape the binding nature of that holding, which also carries 
force as law of the case.  See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
816 (1988) (explaining the doctrine of law of the case as “when a court decides upon a 
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rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages 
in the same case.” (citation omitted)).  In short, under Nunez it was permissible for ICE to 
detain Nunez after the expiration of her temporary detention under the Bail Reform Act, 
and that forecloses the relief she now seeks.   
II.  
  Nunez next challenges the length of her year-and-a-day prison sentence.  In 
determining the term of incarceration, the District Court grouped three of her fraud 
offenses together under Sentencing Guideline § 3D1.2(b).  It explained that those 
offenses of passport fraud, social security fraud, and production of false identifying 
documents were part of a common scheme or plan related to immigration.  But the 
District Court separated out the fourth offense, reasoning that the fraudulent driver’s 
license application was not part of a scheme related to immigration because it enabled 
Nunez to “carry out everyday functions while in the United States.”  Sentencing Tr. 10 at 
lines 19–20 (JA88).  By separating out the fourth offense, the calculation of her sentence 
under the Guidelines included a multiple-count adjustment, and that resulted in a prison 
term of ten to sixteen months.  If the District Court had instead grouped all the offenses 
together as part of the same common scheme, then the range for Nunez’s sentence under 
the Guidelines would have been six to twelve months.  She complains because the 
sentence she received from separating the offenses exceeded by one day the twelve-
month upper limit that would have resulted if the offenses had all been grouped.   
In reviewing the District Court’s calculation for clear error – because Nunez 
preserved an objection to the grouping – we affirm the length of Nunez’s prison term.  
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See United States v. Griswold, 57 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] determination of 
whether various offenses are part of one overall scheme is essentially a factual issue 
which we review under a clearly erroneous standard.” (citation omitted)).  Under the 
Guidelines, “counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into 
a single Group.”  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.  One of the ways that counts can involve 
“substantially the same harm” is by implicating “the same victim and two or more acts or 
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common 
scheme or plan.”  Id. § 3D1.2(b).  As explained in the commentary to the Guidelines, 
immigration offenses are often grouped together: 
Where one count, for example, involves unlawfully entering the United 
States and the other involves possession of fraudulent evidence of 
citizenship, the counts are grouped together because the societal interests 
harmed (the interests protected by laws governing immigration) are closely 
related. 
 
Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.2.  The District Court’s grouping of Counts One through Three 
comports with that commentary.  Each of those offenses related to fraud associated with 
an immigration document.  But Count Four involved fraud related to the issuance of a 
Pennsylvania driver’s license.  The District Court’s conclusion that a driver’s license 
serves a different purpose than the immigration documents is not clearly erroneous and 
will be upheld. 
III.  
 Nunez also challenges, for the first time on appeal, her three-year term of 
supervised release.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, supervised release is generally not 
appropriate for an alien subject to a deportation order.  See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c).  But 
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supervised release for deportable alien is permissible “if the court determines it would 
provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case.”  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5.  For a district court to 
impose a term of supervised release on a deportable alien, it “must state the reasons in 
open court for imposing a [term of supervised release on a deportable immigrant] so that 
the appellate court is not left to speculate about the reasons.”  United States v. Azcona-
Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 
191, 200 (3d Cir. 2011)).   
In reviewing Nunez’s challenge for plain error, the District Court did not err.  See 
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  Before 
explaining its rationale for imposing supervised release, the District Court mentioned the 
presumption against supervised release for a deportable alien and considered Nunez’s ties 
to the community.  It also accounted for Nunez’s husband, two children, and other family 
and friends in the United States, finding that those ties would increase the likelihood that 
Nunez would attempt to reenter the United States upon removal.  Ultimately, the District 
Court concluded that “supervised release is appropriate because of the length of the 
defendant’s deception and to provide an added measure of deterrence to not commit 
future crimes.”  Sentencing Tr. 28, lines 20–23 (JA106).  On this record, Nunez fails to 
establish any error, much less plain error, related to the imposition of supervised release.   
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm both the District Court’s order denying 
Nunez’s motion to dismiss the indictment and Nunez’s sentence.  
